The quiet cost
Every country has a visible infrastructure of roads, ports, and power lines, and a hidden one made of how its organizations actually work. Who gets hired. Who gets promoted. Whether a manager can explain why. Whether a new employee knows what is expected of them, and what they are entitled to, before their first review. This hidden infrastructure decides how far a country’s talent can travel, and in Iran it is in worse repair than the roads.
The damage is concentrated where public money and public appointment reach. In ministries, municipalities, city-owned companies, state enterprises, and the organizations attached to them, selection and advancement run on belief and loyalty before they run on skill. The formal version is gozinesh, the ideological screening that vets candidates for public employment on their beliefs and conduct before anyone asks what they can do. The informal version copies it: the daily sorting of people into insiders and outsiders, khodi and gheyr-e khodi, by whether they pray, how they dress, how proper a woman’s hijab is judged to be, which opinions they voice and which they keep to themselves. It operates at every rank, from the director’s office to the front desk.
Underneath the screening sits a quieter failure: the absence of rules anyone can be held to. Expectations are rarely written down. Rights are rarely stated. Evaluation is whatever the manager says it is, so managers and leaders cannot be held accountable for it. And when a dispute leaves the building, the court that hears it belongs to the same system. A case can turn on the judge’s view of a person’s beliefs, or on who paid whom, so the party who is in the right, whether an employee, a manager, or an owner, can lose. Clear rules, and rules that are protected with no one above them: Iran has neither, and that is the real cost.
Private owners are a different matter. A person who builds a company with their own money and hires a brother or an old friend is exercising a right, and a free market should leave that choice to them. The rules this series argues for apply wherever public money or public appointment is involved. In Iran, that is most of the economy. Nobody can say exactly how much of it the state and its satellites hold; the US Congressional Research Service notes that there are no firm estimates, and the opacity is part of the problem. The shape, though, is not in dispute: ministries and municipalities, state enterprises, religious and charitable foundations, pension funds, state banks and their subsidiaries, military-linked conglomerates, and the firms privatized into their hands, which Iranians call khosulati, private in name and state in practice. Most of the shares sold in two decades of privatization ended up with semi-state entities. Public rules are, in effect, the rules of the Iranian economy.
None of this needs to be described with outrage. It needs to be described as what it is: a system that selects for loyalty and conformity when it could select for capability, and that answers to no rule when it is wrong. The cost is paid every day, in projects that stall, in talent that leaves, in investors who look and walk away, and in organizations that cannot grow beyond the reach of the people who run them. That cost is the subject of this series, and so is the alternative.
Iran does not have a talent problem
Iran has an allocation problem. The country produces engineers, physicians, designers, and managers at a rate most middle-income economies would envy, and then, wherever the state reaches, places them according to loyalty rather than skill. The evidence is in where the talent ends up. Of all the patents registered between 2007 and 2012 by inventors born in Iran, 96 percent were filed by Iranians living abroad; only 4 percent came from inside the country. For inventors born in China, the picture is reversed: 83 percent of their patents came from inside China, according to figures reported by the Migration Policy Institute. Around 130,000 Iranian-born students were enrolled in universities abroad in early 2020, a historic high. More than a quarter of highly educated Iranians at home told Gallup they would leave if they could.
It is tempting to read these numbers as a story about the West pulling Iran’s best people away. The people themselves tell a different story. In a survey by Iran’s own Migration Observatory, reported by Iran International, 62 percent of Iranians abroad said they had no intention of returning, and more than 90 percent said they did not believe official promises about using their potential. They did not leave because the market abroad was open. They left because the system at home was closed.
This matters for who the current arrangement actually hurts. The foreign investor loses an opportunity. The emigrant loses a country. But the person who pays most is the competent professional who stayed: the engineer whose project is run by someone chosen for loyalty, the manager whose review depends on their politics, the young graduate who learns that a degree opens fewer doors than the right answers at a screening interview. A system that promotes around people is a system built against them. The reform this series argues for is the one in which they finally win.
The same Iranians who are passed over at home build companies, run hospitals, and lead research groups wherever the rules are fair. Talent travels well. Favoritism does not.
The outside world already keeps score. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index rates the public sector of 182 countries and territories on how corrupt experts and business executives perceive it to be, from 0 for highly corrupt to 100 for very clean. On the 2025 index, Iran scored 23, against a global average of 42 and a top score of 89 for Denmark, which placed it 153rd of 182. That score describes institutions, not people. The same Iranians who are passed over at home build companies, run hospitals, and lead research groups wherever the rules are fair. Talent travels well. Favoritism does not.
What a healthy organization does differently
A healthy organization rests on three pillars, and none of them is an ideology.
- Capability-based selection. People are hired and promoted for what they can do, demonstrated through work, not for whom they know or what they profess to believe.
- Fair evaluation. Performance is judged against criteria that were known in advance and applied the same way to everyone, so that a manager can explain any decision to the person it affects.
- Transparent expectations. Every person knows what good work looks like in their role before they are measured against it.
The three pillars stand on a foundation, and the foundation is rule of law. Inside the organization, that means rules that are written down and known: what a role requires, how performance is judged, what an employee is entitled to, and how a complaint is heard. Outside it, that means laws that say the same things and courts that apply them regardless of who a person is, what they believe, or whom they know. Written rules are only half of it. The other half is that they are protected: a manager who breaks them answers for it, an owner who breaks them answers for it, a minister who breaks them answers for it. No one is above the rules, and no one is beneath their protection. Without that foundation the pillars are decoration. A fair evaluation that cannot be appealed is a manager’s opinion with a form attached.
None of this is a Western value. These are operating principles, and they work for the same reason in Tehran, Tabriz, Amsterdam, Toronto, or San Francisco: they free people from the loyalty tax.
The loyalty tax is the share of every working day spent on something other than the work. In a loyalty-based organization, people spend energy signaling allegiance, protecting their patron, guessing what the boss wants, and hiding problems that might reflect badly on the people who hired them. Information moves upward only when it is safe. Bad news arrives late. Good people quietly stop trying, because effort does not change outcomes.
Remove the tax and the same people, in the same building, start behaving differently. No one has to become more honest or more hardworking; the rules simply stop punishing honesty and start rewarding work. Problems surface early because reporting them is not dangerous. Decisions improve because the people closest to the facts are allowed to be right. Talent stays because effort is connected to reward. Efficiency, in other words, is not a program to be installed. It is what happens when people can afford to focus on the work.
Investors read the same signals, and they read them from a distance. A foreign partner cannot audit a counterpart’s beliefs or work out which official’s relative sits on its board, and does not try. What they can audit is rules: whether a contract will be enforced as written, whether a dispute will be decided on its merits, whether the manager across the table will still be there after the next political turn. On the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index for 2024, Iran ranked 128th of 142 countries, 131st on constraints on government power and 140th on open government. Those rankings measure exactly what this series is about, and they are among the first things a serious investor looks up. A healthy organization inside a rule-governed state is not only fairer to the people in it. It is the only kind a stranger will put money into.
The scalability ceiling
Choosing someone familiar is not a fault. Trust is the cheapest asset a new organization has, and a founder who hires a sibling or an old friend is spending it well. The ceiling appears when the organization wants to grow, because growth asks two things: that the familiar people are not only trusted but also good, and that the organization learns to bring in people nobody vouched for and make them full members on the strength of their work. No family and no circle of friends is large enough to staff a company of five hundred, let alone five thousand.
Growth past the circle means trusting people you do not know, and the only way to do that at scale is to replace trust in persons with trust in process: a clear job description, a selection method that tests skill, an evaluation anyone can read and challenge, a promotion path that does not depend on who is in the room. These tools let a manager rely on someone they have never met, because they can rely on how that person was chosen and how they are measured. This is the private owner’s own reason to want rules, and it is why the public rules matter to them as well. A firm can build process inside its own walls. It cannot enforce a contract, or appeal an unfair ruling, in a system that offers neither.
A bridge that runs both ways
What makes it possible for people from different countries to work together is not shared values. It is a shared professional grammar: predictability, accountability, feedback, and fairness. Two colleagues can disagree about religion, politics, and how to raise children, and still build something together if each can predict how the other will behave at work, trust that decisions will be explained, and expect that good work will be recognized. Iran does not have to become Western to work with the West. It has to become legible, and the three pillars are what make an organization legible to an outsider.
This is not a story of Iran catching up. Western organizations have their own dysfunctions, and anyone who has worked inside them knows the list. Rules can replace thinking, and people end up following the procedure even when it makes no sense for the case at hand. Work can become purely transactional, with colleagues treated as headcount and loyalty running in one direction only, from employee to employer. Quarterly thinking crowds out long-term building. And networks matter in the West as much as anywhere; a healthy amount of networking is simply how professional life works, in Amsterdam and in Tehran alike. The difference is not whether people know each other. It is whether belief and dress are a job criterion, and whether there is anywhere to appeal when they are. The West has largely solved the problem of trusting strangers. It has not solved the problem of keeping work human.
Iranian workplace culture holds real strengths that address exactly that gap. Relationships at work carry weight: colleagues are people with families, and a crisis in one life is noticed by the others. Hospitality is a method of building trust before a transaction, not after it. Decades of operating under sanctions have produced a capacity for improvisation and resilience that most Western firms have never had to develop, keeping systems running and businesses alive under conditions that would close a company in Amsterdam within a quarter. And loyalty, when it is earned rather than demanded, is durable in a way that Western organizations spend fortunes trying to buy back.
The healthy Iranian organization of the future is therefore not a copy. It combines process-based trust, which the West has refined, with relationship-based trust, which Iran has never lost. A manager who can explain every decision and who also knows their team as people is not a compromise between two cultures. They are better than either on its own, and they are someone both an Iranian and a Western professional would choose to work for.
The Iranian diaspora is the natural connective tissue for this exchange. Millions of Iranians already operate fluently inside Western organizations and still carry the relational culture they grew up with. They are the people who can translate in both directions. They are not, however, the people who will run a free Iran’s organizations, and it would be a mistake to frame them that way. The deepest knowledge of how work actually gets done in Iran, the market, the language, the networks, the unwritten rules, belongs to those who stayed. In a merit-based system, that knowledge is a capability, and a larger market needs more of it, not less. The diaspora builds the bridge. The people inside Iran are the ones the bridge is for.
What a leader inside Iran can do today
Organizational culture is not law. It is practiced one team at a time, and that means it can be practiced now. A manager in a private firm cannot change how the state vets its employees. They can decide how their own team is run, and within their own four walls the three pillars are entirely within reach.
Write expectations down. For each role on your team, put on one page what good work looks like this quarter. Share it before anyone is evaluated against it.
Write rights down too. Beside the expectations, state what each person is entitled to and how a complaint is heard, and by whom. A rule people cannot invoke is not a rule.
Make every review explainable. Before you rate someone, ask whether you could explain the rating to that person using only the criteria they already knew about. If you cannot, the criteria are the problem.
Test for what the job needs. Decide first whether the role is mostly technical, mostly relational, or both, and test for that: a realistic task for the engineer, a real conversation with a difficult client for the account manager. An interview that only measures how much you liked the candidate tells you nothing about either.
Promote on delivery. The next time a position opens, choose the person whose results you can point to, and say so out loud. Your team will notice.
Protect the messenger. When someone brings you bad news early, thank them in front of others. Information flows toward safety.
These are healthy islands. They already exist in Iran, in technology firms, professional practices, and family businesses that quietly outgrew the family. None of them requires permission. Each one makes a team more productive now, and each one builds the habits that a free Iran will need at scale. The leader who starts today is not waiting for the future. They are training the people who will build it, and when the rules change, their team will not need a transition period: it will already be the kind of organization the new rules reward and outside partners look for.
The market will reward what you build now
When Iran opens, the fear inside the country will be that the opening belongs to others: to foreign firms with deeper pockets, to returnees with foreign degrees, to anyone but the people who stayed. The opposite is true. An open market rewards exactly what a healthy organization produces: people who can be trusted on their work, teams that can absorb strangers, leaders who can explain their decisions to a partner in another time zone, and rules that partner can read before signing. Those are skills, and skills are built where you are, with the team you have.
For the reader outside Iran, the same argument is an invitation. A country of around ninety million people, with one of the most educated workforces in its region, an industrial base that kept running under sanctions, and a diaspora already fluent in your institutions, is a market that has been closed by its rules, not by its people. When the rules change, the first partners through the door will be the ones who understood its organizations beforehand: which firms already run on skill and results, how trust is built in a relational culture, what a manager in Shiraz will expect from a counterpart in Amsterdam and what that counterpart can expect in return. These articles are written so that an outsider can read them as a map of that terrain, and as a case that the opportunity is real: not a market to be taught, but a partner to be met.
Iran’s roads will be rebuilt by contractors. Its hidden infrastructure can only be rebuilt by the people who work inside its organizations, and that work has already begun wherever a manager decided to hire for skill and review for results. The articles that follow take each pillar in turn: how to select for capability rather than loyalty, how to build evaluation and expectations that create trust in strangers, and how to work across cultures on values that are relatable rather than identical. Each is written for both readers at once: for the Iranian manager who wants to build a healthy organization now, and for the foreign partner who wants to recognize one when they see it. The destination is an Iran whose organizations are strong enough to meet the world as an equal, and whose people are the first to benefit from that strength. The second to benefit will be the partners who arrive prepared.
Sources and notes
Transparency International scores via Trading Economics: Iran scored 23 of 100 on the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, rank 153 of 182. The scale, the country count, the global average of 42, and Denmark’s top score of 89 are from Transparency International’s CPI 2025 release, as summarized by Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer (February 2026).
World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2024, Iran country profile: overall rank 128 of 142; constraints on government powers 131; open government 140; civil justice 73.
Migration Policy Institute, “Iran’s Brain Drain” (April 2021): patent figures (The Economist, 2007 to 2012), Stanford Iran 2040 estimate of about 130,000 students abroad (early 2020), Gallup finding that more than a quarter of highly educated Iranians would emigrate if they could (2015 to 2017).
Iran International, August 2023: Iran Migration Observatory survey of Iranians abroad, 62 percent with no intention of returning, over 90 percent distrusting official promises about using their potential.
Congressional Research Service, “Iran’s State-Linked Conglomerates” (October 2016): “There are no firm estimates for the extent of the role in the economy that the state-linked economic institutions play.”
Bijan Khajehpour, Al-Monitor (October 2019): most of the shares sold on the capital markets in Iran’s privatizations ended up in the hands of semi-state entities.
Gozinesh is the ideological selection process for public employment in Iran; khodi and gheyr-e khodi are the colloquial insider and outsider categories; khosulati is the colloquial term for firms that are private in name but controlled by state or semi-state owners. All are used descriptively, not as legal terms.